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[207] 
Federal Right to Try Act: Heightened Informed 
Consent and Price Regulation Measures  
Will Improve Quality, Autonomy, and  






This Note will examine the federal Right to Try Act, which was enacted 
on May 30, 2018. The federal statute followed the passage of Right to Try 
legislation in thirty-eight states, including California.1 Much controversy has 
surrounded “Right to Try” as an alternative to preexisting pathways to 
investigational drug treatments, such as traditional clinical trials and the 
FDA2-regulated Expanded Access program, also commonly known as 
“Compassionate Use.”3 
Previously, the Expanded Access program was the only pathway 
outside of clinical trials to provide terminally ill patients with a last chance 
at survival with non-FDA approved experimental drug treatments.4 
Proponents contend that the “Right to Try” pathway is a more streamlined 
method of providing access to experimental drugs, free from burdensome 
paperwork and FDA regulation. However, prior to the bill being enacted by 
Congress, over one hundred patient’s rights groups opposed it.5 
This Note will examine those criticisms, evaluate the federal Right to 
 
  *J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2020; B.A. Political 
Science/Law and Society, University of California, Riverside, 2014. 
 1. Jacqueline Howard, What you need to know about right to try legislation, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018, 
1:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html. 
 2. Food and Drug Administration. 
 3. Jacqueline Howard, What you need to know about right to try legislation, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018, 
1:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html; Michael 
Nedelman & Jacqueline Howard, ‘Right-to-Try’ bill passes Congress, CNN, (May 29, 2018, 1:48 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/health/right-to-try-legislation-congress/index.html. 
 4. Michael Nedelman & Jacqueline Howard, ‘Right-to-Try’ bill passes Congress, CNN, (May 29, 
2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/health/right-to-try-legislation-congress/index.html. 
 5. Letter from A Twist of Fae-ATS et al., Patient and Provider Orgs., to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Reps. & Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Reps (May 21, 2018), https://www. 
acscan.org/sites/default/files/National%20Documents/Senate%20Right%20to%20Try%20%28S.204%2
9%20Coalition%20Opposition%20Letter%205.21.2018.pdf. 
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Try Act, and propose amendments through the lenses of health care quality, 
patient autonomy, and long-term scientific innovation. Some controversy 
stems from the federal Right to Try Act, which affirmatively absolves drug 
companies of legal liability in order to incentivize them to participate in 
Right to Try programs. This feature is yet to be proven effective and raises 
red flags in patients’ rights. This Note proposes to amend the federal Right 
to Try Act to include a comprehensive informed consent section mimicking 
both the California’s Right to Try Act and the safeguards used in the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act. Additionally, the business structure that the federal 
Right to Try Act creates brings about exploitation concerns and exposes 
vulnerable patients to serious financial risks. Lastly, this Note proposes to 
amend the federal Right to Try Act to include anti-price gouging language 
and to re-incorporate FDA oversight of charging as safeguards against 
exploitation. 
 
II. FDA APPROVAL OF INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS 
 
In the 1950s, a German company, Chemie Grünenthal, developed 
thalidomide and marketed the drug in Europe as the first safe sleeping pill.6 
Thalidomide was also seen as a highly effective treatment for pregnant 
women with morning sickness, and it gained widespread popularity in 
Europe.7 The first known victim of thalidomide was a girl born with no ears 
in 1956, though the cause was not discovered until years later.8 
Progressively, thousands of mothers who had taken thalidomide while 
pregnant gave birth to thousands of children born with extreme 
disfigurations.9 Thalidomide-affected children were born with flipper-like 
arms and legs, which some parents had amputated in order to accommodate 
for prosthetic limbs.10 Other parents rejected thalidomide-affected children 
and had them institutionalized, and in one case, a young mother and her 
doctor were charged with the mercy killing of her deformed child.11 The 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) reviewed thalidomide for drug 
approval in 1960, but delayed approval due to lack of rigorous research 
supporting the drug’s safety.12 The FDA never approved thalidomide.13 By 
 
 6.  Michael Winerip, The Death and Afterlife of Thalidomide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/booming/the-death-and-afterlife-of-thalidomide.html. 
 7. Id. 
 8. The girl was born in 1956, but evidence linking thalidomide to birth defects did not become 
public until 1961. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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1962, the drug was banned worldwide, and the thalidomide crisis is one 
principal reason for the FDA’s strict drug regulation.14 
The FDA must approve all drugs introduced into interstate 
commerce.15 Although lengthy, the approval process is designed to 
thoroughly investigate the safety and efficacy of investigational new drugs 
in four clinical trial phases.16 First, drug sponsors submit an Investigational 
New Drug (“IND”) application to the FDA to demonstrate that a drug has 
been tested on animals and is reasonably safe for initial use on humans.17 
Phase I involves a months-long study of the drug’s safety and dosage on 
20-100 participants.18 Approximately seventy percent of drugs pass Phase 
I.19 Phase II trials test the drug’s efficacy and side effects on up to several 
hundred participants for a duration of anywhere between months to two 
years.20 Approximately thirty-three percent of drugs pass Phase II.21 Phase 
III trials further test drug efficacy in addition to adverse reactions on 300 
to 3,000 participants; the duration of the trials last between one to four 
years, and only approximately twenty-five to thirty percent of drugs pass 
this phase.22 The investigational new drugs then move on to Phase IV, 
where the FDA reviews all results from previous phases along with any 
additional reports, proposed labeling and directions for use, and safety 
updates.23 Under this process, it can take up to ten years for the FDA to 
approve a drug for prescription.24 
 
III. ALTERNATIVE ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS 
 
The FDA approval process for new drugs takes time, a luxury that some 
terminally ill patients cannot afford.25 In response, the FDA created the 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate 
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) is 
effective with respect to such drug.”). 
 16. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FDA (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/ 
developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/investigationaln
ewdrugindapplication/default.htm. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals 
/Drugs/ucm405622.htm#Clinical_Research_Phase_Studies. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Step 4: FDA Drug Review, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/ 
Approvals/Drugs/ucm405570.htm. 
 24. How Long Does the FDA Take to Approve a Drug?, U.S. DEPT. OF VET. AFFS., https:// 
www.hiv.va.gov/patient/clinical-trials/drug-approval-process.asp (last visited Fed. 23, 2020). 
 25. Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill to Take Control of Their 
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Expanded Access program (“EA”), also known as “Compassionate Use,” to 
allow terminally ill patients access to investigational drugs that have not yet 
passed the final FDA approval phase.26 States have also responded with 
Right to Try legislation, permitting drug companies to provide very sick 
patients with Phase I investigational drugs even without EA approval.27 
These efforts toward alternative access to investigational drugs came to a 
head when Congress enacted The Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan 
McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, the federal 
counterpart to state Right to Try legislation.28 Through the federal Right to 
Try Act, Congress sought to permit drug companies to provide Phase I 
investigational drugs to patients with life threatening diseases.29 
 
A. FDA EXPANDED ACCESS POLICY 
 
Under EA, a patient with a serious or life threatening disease left with no 
other comparable treatment may have access to an investigational drug.30 The 
requirements for this access are that a licensed physician or drug company 
must submit an EA application form to the FDA on the patient’s behalf and 
find a willing drug company to provide the investigational drug.31 The 
physician is responsible for filling out the paperwork, obtaining the patient’s 
informed consent pursuant to the codified informed consent elements for 
investigational drug use, which must also be reviewed by an Institutional 
Review Board (“IRB”), and monitor the course of treatment.32 In approving 
the application, the FDA must determine that the potential benefit of the EA 
drug use justifies the risks of the treatment, and that providing the drug will 
not interfere with the clinical investigations of the drug for marketing 
approval.33 In 2017, the FDA approved 1,632 out of 1,637 received EA 
applications for investigational drugs.34 
 
Treatment, GOLDWATER INST. (Oct. 7, 2014), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/everyone-deserves-
right-try-empowering-terminally/. 
 26. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305 (2009). 
 27.  Daniel A. Kracov et al., National Right to Try Legislation Passes Congress, ARNOLD & 
PORTER (May 23, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/05/national-
right-to-try-legislation-passes-congress. 
 28. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 21 C.F.R. § 312.300 (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305 (2009). 
 31. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) (2009). 
 32. General responsibilities of investigators, 84 Fed. Reg. 5968-02, 312, 812 (Feb. 25, 2019) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.60); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(1) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4) (2009). 
 33. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) (2009). 
 34. CDER, CBER and CDRH Expanded Access INDs and Protocols (2014-2018), FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/publichealthfocus/expandedaccesscompassionateuse/ucm443572.htm#
Expanded_Access_IND1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
4 - LIN_HBLJV16_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2020  8:16 AM 
Summer 2020 FEDERAL RIGHT TO TRY ACT 211 
By 2015, in response to repeated criticism to alleviate the administrative 
burden of EA requirements, the FDA made efforts to streamline EA 
approval.35 The agency introduced simplified application forms that were 
purported to take only forty-five minutes for a physician to complete, and 
included expedited IRB full-board approval processes for treatment by only 
requiring one IRB member to approve treatment.36 
Despite these efforts to streamline the EA process, drug companies have 
been reluctant to participate in EA in fear that adverse reactions to 
investigational drugs will become an obstacle to drug approval.37 To dispel 
discouragement, the FDA published guidance for the industry, clarifying that 
adverse reactions are reviewed through the FDA approval process under a 
causation requirement.38 In the guidance, the FDA reassures that it reviews 
adverse events within the context of the treatment, acknowledging how 
various uncontrolled factors inherent in EA often create difficulty in linking 
treatment to a particular adverse event.39 
EA was created to treat very sick patients, but with close FDA 
oversight.40 The FDA purportedly approves ninety-nine percent of EA 
applications and approves applications within days or even hours over the 
phone for emergencies.41 Despite the FDA’s continued efforts to streamline 
the EA application process, drug companies remain reluctant to participate. 
 
B. STATE RIGHT TO TRY LEGISLATION 
 
In May 2014, Colorado enacted their Right to Try Act, allowing 
terminally ill patients who are unable to participate in clinical trials, and have 
exhausted all other methods of treatment, to receive investigational drugs 
provided by willing drug manufacturers without FDA approval of the 
treatment.42 Since then, forty states have enacted Right to Try legislation, 
 
 35. FDA Voices: Perspectives From FDA Experts, FDA, https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/ 
2017/10/expanded-access-fda-describes-efforts-to-ease-application-process/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2020); 
Alexander Gaffney, From 100 Hours to 1: FDA Dramatically Simplifies Its Compassionate Use Process, 
REGULATORY AFF. PROF’LS SOC’Y: REGULATORY FOCUS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.raps.org/regula 
tory-focus™/news-articles/2015/2/from-100-hours-to-1-fda-dramatically-simplifies-its-compass ionate-
use-process. 
 36. FDA Voices: Perspectives From FDA Experts, FDA, supra note 31. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use—Questions and Answers: 
Guidance for Industry, FDA (June 2016), available at 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM3
51261.pdf. 
 39. Id. at 18. 
 40. Id. at 2. 
 41. FDA Voices: Perspectives From FDA Experts, FDA, supra note 31. 
 42. H.B. 14-1281, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Co. 2014); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
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including California.43 As of April 2018, those states are Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.44 The state 
versions of the legislation vary, such as Colorado’s and California’s, which 
include robust informed consent requirements, whereas other versions, like 
Arkansas’s, do not.45 California’s Right to Try Act also includes a section 
absolving manufacturers against liability for any injury that results from the 
non-negligent investigational drug treatment.46 
State efforts to introduce Right to Try investigational drug access were 
still not enough as critics considered state Right to Try laws mere “placebo 
legislation.”47 Treatment under the Right to Try pathways have gone 
unused.48 Drug companies still seemed reluctant to provide investigational 
drugs due to concerns that the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act preempted any 
state legislation on the subject and for fear of scaring away investors.49 Even 
under State Right to Try legislation similar to California’s, drug companies 
also feared that any adverse results from the treatment would be used to by 





111548.1(h) (West 2017). 
 43. Jacqueline Howard, What you need to know about right to try legislation, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018, 
1:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html. 
 44. Michael Nedelman & Jacqueline Howard, ‘Right-to-Try’ bill passes Congress, CNN, (May 29, 
2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/health/right-to-try-legislation-congress/index.html. 
 45. 2015 Ark. S.B. 4, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (enacted). 
 46.  H.B. 14-1281, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
111548 (2019). 
 47. David Gorski, The Very Worst Version of the Sham Known as “Right to Try” is Poised to 
Become Law, SCI. BASED MEDICINE (May 21, 2018), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/the-very-worst-
version-of-the-sham-known-as-right-to-try-is-poised-to-become-law/. 
 48.  Kate Gallin Heffernan et al., Expanded Access and Right to Try: The Impact of Recent 
Legislative Changes, ADVARRA (May 30, 2018), https://www.advarra.com/resource-library/expanded-
access-and-right-to-try-the-impact-of-recent-legislative-changes/. 
 49. Nicole Van Groningen, The Right-To-Try Bill Puts Patients At Risk In The Name Of Helping 
Them, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-vangroni 
ngen-righttotry-bill_us_5b0ebcc4e4b0fdb2aa58c732; Marianne Spencer, Prescribing a Cure for Right-
to-Try Legislation, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 30 (2018). 
 50. Sammy Caiola, Federal Right To Try Proposal Could make Califoria Law More Effective, CAP. 
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/01/31/federal-right-to-try-proposal-
could-make-california-law-more-effective. 
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C. FEDERAL RIGHT TO TRY ACT 
 
On May 30, 2018, Congress enacted a federal Right to Try Act, 
expanding this alternative pathway to investigational drugs nationwide.51 
Similar to the state versions, the federal statute allows anyone with a “life 
threatening disease” who has exhausted all other treatment options to receive 
investigational drugs past Phase I clinical trial approval from a willing drug 
company.52 A “life threatening disease” is defined as a disease or condition 
with a high likelihood of death unless the course of the disease is 
interrupted.53 The eligible patient must be left with no other option for 
treatment, including treatment through clinical trial participation, and must 
submit written informed consent to their physician.54 
In an attempt to encourage drug companies to provide investigational 
drugs to eligible patients, the federal Right to Try Act absolves drug 
companies from liability for negligent investigational drug treatment.55 
Further, the statute prohibits the FDA from using any clinical outcome 
associated with the use of the investigational drug to delay or adversely affect 
the ongoing FDA approval of the investigational drug.56 Drug companies are 
required to report annual summaries of each investigational drug used, which 
includes information regarding any known serious adverse events.57 Serious 
adverse events include those involving death, life-threatening adverse 
events, inpatient hospitalization, prolongation of existing hospitalization, a 
persistent or significant incapacity or substantial disruption of the ability to 
function normally, and congenital anomalies or birth defects.58 These serious 
adverse events cannot affect the investigational drug’s FDA approval unless 
the Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department (“HHS”) 
decides that the serious adverse event is critical to determining the 
investigational drug’s safety.59 In any case, the Secretary of the HHS must 
post an annual summary report of the amount of investigational drugs for 
which serious adverse events were or were not reviewed in the FDA approval 
process on the FDA website.60 These provisions set out to promote Right to 
Try treatment by reducing a drug company’s risk when providing an eligible 
patient with an investigational drug. 
 
 51. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018). 
 52. Id. 
 53.  21 C.F.R. § 312.81(a)(1); 21 U.C.S. § 360 bbb-0a(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(B) (2018). 
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018). 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(c) (2018). 
 57. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(d) (2018). 
 58. 21 C.F.R. § 312.32 (2011). 
 59. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(c)(1)(A) (2018). 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(d) (2018). 
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IV. CRITICISMS OF THE RIGHT TO TRY 
 
Since its introduction, critics have accused the Right to Try campaign 
of furthering a hidden agenda to eliminate FDA oversight of drugs.61 When 
the FDA monitors investigational drug treatment through EA, it often 
changes treatment protocol based on its exclusive expert consultant 
information.62 Patient advocates have grown concerned that without FDA 
consultation, investigational drug treatment increases risk to patients.63 
Safety concerns also stem from the fact that Phase I investigational drugs are 
typically only tested on twenty to eighty healthy volunteers, which does not 
thoroughly establish the drugs’ safety.64 Finally, unlike EA, which requires 
IRB review of treatment protocol and references a list of informed consent 
standards for investigational drug treatment, Right to Try laws bypass IRB 
review of treatment protocol and do not establish informed consent 
standards.65 Taken together, the absence of these safeguards have elicited 
over one hundred patient advocacy groups to oppose the federal Right to Try 
Act.66 
These one hundred patient and provider groups expressed their strong 
opposition to the Senate version of the Right to Try Act—which is now the 
enacted federal Right to Try Act—in a letter to House leadership.67 The 
patient and provider groups preferred the House version of the Right to Try 
bill, which was safer for patients because it established informed consent 
standards equivalent to those of EA and its FDA reporting requirements were 







 61. Michael Hiltzik, Right-To-Try Laws Are Hazardous To Your Health—And Now They’re Backed 
By The Koch Brothers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018, 2:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/ 
la-fi-hiltzik-right-to-try-20180122-story.html. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Heffernan et al., supra note 44. 
 66. Letter from A Twist of Fae-ATS et al., Patient and Provider Orgs., to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Reps. & Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Reps (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.acscan.org/sites/default/files/National%20Documents/Senate%20Right%20to%20Try%20
%28S.204%29%20Coalition%20Opposition%20Letter%205.21.2018.pdf. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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A. CONCERNS REGARDING LIMITED LIABILITY AND INFORMED 
CONSENT 
 
Perhaps the most concerning feature of the federal Right to Try Act is 
the section that completely exculpates drug sponsors and manufacturers 
and exculpates physicians against ordinary negligence. A prescriber, 
dispenser, or other individual entity providing such treatment may only be 
found liable as a result of reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, 
or an intentional tort.69 This feature of the statute was meant to incentivize 
drug companies to make investigational drugs available to terminally ill 
patients.70 However, tort law is the primary method of dealing with 
providers’ medical errors, and without the option of filing negligence 
claims, injured patients are left with no legal recourse.71 
Another concerning feature of the federal Right to Try Act is that it 
leaves patients unprotected without robust informed consent standards. 
Medical ethicists have warned against the dangers of investigational drug 
treatment.72 Many investigational drugs can hasten death or produce 
negative side effects that reduce a patient’s remaining quality of life instead 
of heal the patient.73 While the federal Right to Try Act does explicitly 
require that the eligible patients provide written informed consent to the 
investigational drug treatment, it is silent as to the criteria the informed 
consent must meet.74 
In the past, courts have used informed consent and adequate warning 
as tools to offset limited liability for drug companies. For example, drug 
manufacturers in California can avoid strict liability for drug injuries if the 
drug is properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of any risks known 
at the time of distribution.75 Also, under the learned intermediary doctrine, 
drug manufacturers can avoid prescription drug liability for injuries as long 
as the manufacturers provide appropriate warning to a patient’s 
physician.76 Once the physician has been adequately warned, he or she 
 
 69. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018). 
 70. Caiola, supra note 46. 
 71. Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare 
System, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10 (2011). 
 72. See Interview with Arthur Caplan, NYU Langone Medical Center, ‘Right to try’ law gives 
terminal patients access to drugs not approved by FDA, PBS: PBS NEWS HOUR WEEKEND (June 21, 
2014, 11:59 AM) https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/right-try-law-gives-terminal-patients-access-non-
fda-approved-drugs. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
 75. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 3d 1049, 1069 (Cal. 1988). 
 76. Id. 
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inherits the duty to provide adequate warning to the patient.77 Then, as the 
learned intermediary, the physician must provide adequate warning by 
obtaining the patient’s informed consent.78 
In theory, a patient with informed consent has all the material 
information necessary to exercise patient autonomy, but critics have 
questioned whether the requirement effectively facilitates truly informed 
decisions.79 Genuine informed consent is particularly difficult to attain in 
the experimental treatment context because even the physician may not 
know how safe or effective the treatment is.80 As mentioned above, some 
experimental treatments have only passed Phase I of clinical trials, which 
only monitors basic patient safety information.81 Under these 
circumstances, because drug sponsors have not tested for efficacy at all, or 
completed more thorough tests for safety, physicians administering the 
experimental treatments may not be able to provide patients with a precise 
idea of the risks the patient should be considering.82 
Nonetheless, even if informed consent is not sufficient to allow 
patients to make the best medical decisions for themselves, history has 
shown that informed consent is at least necessary for patient safety. 
In Mink v. University of Chicago, in the early 1950s, the University of 
Chicago’s teaching hospital provided over 1,000 women diethylstilbestrol 
(“DES”) for “prenatal care.”83 The women did not know until almost two 
decades later that the hospital administered the DES to them or that they 
were part of a clinical trial sponsored by the manufacturer to determine 
whether DES prevented miscarriages.84 Fearing that their children faced an 
increased risk of cancer from the in utero exposure to DES, the women 
filed a class action lawsuit against the manufacturer and the University.85 
The defense argued that the women consented to any course of treatment 
by simply entering the hospital for prenatal care.86 The court, however, 
disagreed and ruled that the women had genuine claims for battery.87 This 
 
 77. Hill v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 943, 954 (E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 78. Jerica L. Peters, Developments in Science and Technology Law—Part I, State v. Karl: An 
Unreasonable Rejection of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 285 (2008). 
 79. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental 
Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 364 (2002). 
 80. Michael Imbroscio & Gabriel Bell, Adequate Drug Warnings in the Face of Uncertain 
Causality: The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and the Need for Clarity, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 847, 859 
(2005). 
 81. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FDA, supra note 12. 
 82. Imbroscio & Bell, supra note 76. 
 83. Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1978) [hereinafter Mink]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 718. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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case illustrates why informed consent is necessary as a safeguard against 
drug companies exploiting people seeking safe treatment. Without such 
safeguards in place, drug companies and physicians embody medical 
paternalism and act without regard to public safety by providing 
experimental treatment to patients without their knowledge or consent that 
potentially exposed more than 1,000 children to cancer as a direct result.88 
The idea of informed consent between a physician and a patient is 
central to the drug manufacturer’s defense of the learned intermediary 
doctrine.89 This doctrine operates as a manufacturer’s defense against 
liability by distributing some of the responsibility to warn about the risks 
of a prescription drug to the prescribing physician.90 The doctrine provides 
that as long as the drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn the physician 
about the risks, it does not need to give any warning to the patient.91 Most 
states have accepted the learned intermediary doctrine as a common law 
defense.92 Typically, exceptions to it are only found in circumstances when 
a physician’s ability to provide the patient with informed consent is 
diminished, like when the manufacturer directly advertises the drug to the 
consumer.93 
In Perez v. Wyeth, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that when 
mass marketing influences a patient’s choice of prescription drug, the 
manufacturer that makes direct claims to consumers regarding the drug’s 
efficacy should not be relieved of its duty to provide the consumer with 
adequate warnings under the learned intermediary doctrine.94 The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey is one of the only courts to apply this exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine, which has not been accepted in federal 
court.95 Nonetheless, this narrow exception to the learned intermediary 
doctrine clarifies how absolving drug companies from liability is fair when 
physician informed consent safeguards are in place, but if the physician-
patient relationship is altered so that adequate informed consent is not 
likely to occur, drug companies may still be liable.96 The key feature of the 
standard learned intermediary doctrine in absolving drug company liability 
is the reliance on the physician as the learned intermediary to provide the 
patient with proper information about the dangers or side effects of the 
 
 88. See id. 
 89. Frank C. Woodside & Margaret M. Maggio, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Is it 
Eroding?, 52 FED. LAW. 28, 30–32 (2005). 
 90. Id. at 30. 
 91. Id. at 29. 
 92. Id. at 30. 
 93. Id. at 32–35. 
 94. Perez v. Wyeth, 161 N.J. 1, 4 (N.J. 1999) [hereinafter Perez]. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. 
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drug.97 
In the landmark case, Canterbury v. Spence, the nineteen-year-old 
patient, Canterbury, sought treatment for back pain.98 After consulting 
different practitioners, he eventually met Doctor Spence, who 
recommended that he undergo a laminectomy, which is the excision of the 
posterior arch of the vertebra, to correct a suspected ruptured disc.99 Doctor 
Spence did not disclose to Canterbury that the recommended surgery posed 
a risk of paralysis, and Canterbury did not raise any objections or inquire 
further regarding the procedure.100 After the surgery and a series of 
complications, Canterbury ended up paralyzed from the waist down and 
brought suit against Doctor Spence for his failure to reveal the risk of 
paralysis from the procedure.101 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia expounded that “the average patient has little to no 
understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to 
whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent 
decision.”102 The court held that the physician-patient dynamic creates the 
need, and therefore, the requirement, for the physician to provide the 
patient with the necessary information to make such a decision.103 
Adequate warning and informed consent continue to be an issue for 
drug manufacturers and physicians.104 In Thom v. Bristol Myers-Squibb 
Co., Thom developed permanent penile injury from taking the prescription 
drug Serzone to treat his sleep problems and depression.105 Thom sued the 
drug manufacturer, Bristol Myers-Squibb, for failure to provide adequate 
warning of the risks of permanent penile injury in Serzone’s package 
inserts, which caused his physician, Doctor Schueler, to not discuss the 
possibility of such risks with Thom prior to prescribing it.106 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of the 
manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment due to genuine issues 
regarding proximate cause.107 
In Parker v. Harper, the Parkers sued Doctor Harper for the failure to 
inform them of the potential side effects of Dilantin, which Doctor Harper 
 
 97. Id. at 30–32. 
 98. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1972) [hereinafter Canterbury]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 777. 
 102. Id. at 780. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F. 3d 848 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 105. Id. at 850 [hereinafter Thom]. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 858. 
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prescribed to treat their minor daughter’s seizures.108 The treatment left her 
with disfiguring scars and vision impairment that were more likely than not 
symptoms of Steven-Johnson syndrome.109 The Parkers argued that had they 
been informed that ingesting Dilantin poses a risk of Stevens-Johnson 
syndrome, they would not have consented to the treatment.110 The Louisiana 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Doctor Harper because there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether he provided the Parkers with informed consent.111 
Each of these cases—Mink, Perez, Canterbury, Thom, and Parker—
illustrate the crucial role informed consent plays in a patient’s decision to 
accept the risks in treatment. 
Courts have consistently supported the idea that as long as patients are 
fully informed of the material risks of their medical treatment, then they are 
capable of making decisions to accept the treatment, and that decision 
absolves the physician and drug manufacturers from liability. As such, it is 
a red flag that the new federal Right to Try Act gives drug companies and 
physicians so much protection against liability yet does not give patients 
equal protection with strong informed consent requirements, as discussed 
infra. 
 
1. The Imbalanced Federal Right to Try Act Raises Quality and Individual 
Autonomy Issues 
 
Upon taking a closer look at the implications of the imbalanced federal 
Right to Try Act, it seems that this federal statute is inconsistent with two 
health care principles: quality of care and the preservation of individual 
autonomy. 
Quality of care is a chief concern of the health-care system, and 
informed consent is meant to safeguard against poor quality health care, 
amongst other dangers.112 The act of informing patients encourages 
physicians to carefully consider their decisions while practicing medicine.113 
Further, informed consent requirements formally facilitate trust in the 
physician-patient relationship, which is a critical component of providing 
quality medical care.114 
 
 108. Parker v. Harper, 803 So. 2d 76, 79 (La. Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Parker]. 
 109. Id. at 85. Stevens-Johnson syndrome is a skin rash. Id. at 84. 
 110. Id. at 80. 
 111. Id. at 86. 
 112. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1, 132 (8th ed. 
2018) 
 113. Id. 
 114. Mark Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 489 (2002). 
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Trust is the defining characteristic of the physician-patient relationship, 
and preserving it is a prominent objective in health care law and medical 
ethics.115 Even the most ordinary illness can create a profound sense of 
vulnerability in a patient, which can attack the fundamental unity of mind 
and body.116 This deep vulnerability causes many people to revert to a 
childlike state with a strong desire to be cared for.117 Psychologically, under 
these circumstances, a patient has little choice but to place his or her trust in 
a physician, and there is strong evidence that the effectiveness of treatment 
depends on that trust.118 This placebo-like effect is one example of how trust 
in treatment can enhance healing.119 The phenomenal effects of trust in 
health care is largely supported by anecdotal evidence because it is not 
empirically studied but most people resonate with the therapeutic benefits of 
trust in clinical encounters.120 
Along with quality, individual autonomy is another chief concern 
within the health-care system.121 The information physicians provide to 
patients fosters rational decision-making by the patient and promotes 
individual autonomy.122 The doctrine of informed consent is based on the 
principle of bodily self-determination—the notion that “every human being 
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body.”123 As such, patients exercise their right to autonomy 
with informed consent.124 Without informed consent, patients may lose 
autonomy by making decisions without fully understanding the proposed 
treatment or its full benefits and risks.125 Moreover, the principles of quality 
health care and patient autonomy are intertwined, as research also suggests 
that patients exercising autonomy by being fully involved in the management 
of their treatment leads to better quality healthcare.126 
Given the risks associated with a terminally ill patient’s circumstances, 
having trust and reliance on a conscientious physician is especially 
important.127 As such, a health care statute that does not have robust informed 
consent requirements may give way to poor quality health care and neglect 
 
 115. Id. at 471. 
 116. Id. at 477–78. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 479. 
 120. Id. at 482. 
 121. Furrow, supra note 108. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Peters, supra note 74, at 299. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Furrow, supra note 108, at 133. 
 127. Caplan, supra note 68. 
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of the principles of patient autonomy. 
 
2. Solution: Heightened Informed Consent Will Offset Liability Issues 
 
Generally, adequate informed consent is obtained when a patient 
understands their diagnosis or nature of the problem, the nature and purposes 
of the proposed treatment, reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the 
treatment and the likelihood of the occurrence of risk, potential severity of 
the risks, reasonable alternatives and the benefits and risks of those 
alternatives, and the probable risks and benefits of foregoing the proposed 
treatment.128 The FDA deems that adequate informed consent is obtained in 
clinical trials for investigational drugs when the patient has signed a written 
statement that describes and explains the research.129 EA also incorporates 
the same informed consent requirements.130 The description must include 
reasonably foreseeable risks, discomfort, or benefits from the drug, what 
appropriate alternative treatments exist, that the treatment may involve 
unforeseeable risks, and any consequences that would follow a decision to 
withdraw from the clinical trial.131 
Although previous federal Right to Try bills referenced an informed 
consent section, the enacted federal Right to Try Act is silent as to the 
standards of informed consent for investigational drug treatment.132 Silence 
on the informed consent issue could be detrimental to the quality of health 
care these already terminally ill patients receive, as well as strip them of what 
little autonomy they have left. It may be possible that courts could interpret 
the Federal Right to Try Act to incorporate the FDA’s clinical trial informed 
consent requirements as parts of the same legislative scheme. However, 
those informed consent criteria may not be appropriate because the research 
purpose of providing drugs under clinical trials is inherently different from 
the purpose of providing treatment under the Right to Try Act.133 Thus, 
section 360bbb-oa(a)(1)(C), which requires eligible investigational drug 
patients to provide written informed consent, must be amended to 
incorporate informed consent requirements suitable for a Right to Try 
patient’s circumstances. 
A proposed solution to this issue is to amend the federal Right to Try 
 
 128. Peters, supra note 74. 
 129. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2011). 
 130. General responsibilities of investigators, 84 Fed. Reg. 5968-02, 312, 812 (proposed Feb. 25, 
2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.60); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(1) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4) 
(2009). 
 131. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2011). 
 132. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-oa(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
 133. Noah, supra note 75, at 388. 
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Act to reflect California’s state Right to Try Act’s (“California Act”)134 
robust informed consent standards specifically aimed toward informing 
terminally ill patients of the implications of using investigational drugs for 
treatment. The California Right to Try Act contains a comprehensive list of 
elements of informed consent for investigational drug treatment.135 Under 
the California Right to Try Act, written informed consent must include an 
explanation of existing approved products and treatments for the disease or 
condition and the potentially best and worst outcomes of the new treatment, 
including new, unanticipated, different, or worse symptoms that may 
result.136 The description must also disclose that death could be hastened by 
the treatment.137 These California informed consent criteria take into account 
that terminally ill patients may be so desperate for marginal results that they 
may not fully comprehend the risks of their condition worsening as a result 
of going through investigational treatment. 
Another solution to the problem of the federal Right to Try Act’s 
lacking informed consent requirements is to incorporate the measures 
required by Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (“Oregon Act”). Laws such as 
the Oregon Act dealing with a different type of end-of-life decision making, 
known as Right to Die statutes, have heightened requirements in evaluating 
whether a patient’s end-of-life decision is one that is fully informed.138 While 
some terminally ill patients seek experimental treatment to save their lives, 
other terminally ill patients seek medical aid in dying.139 State Right to Die 
laws, such as Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, require that a physician 
provide information on the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis, potential risks 
associated with, and probable result of, taking the medication, and available 
feasible alternatives.140 Additionally, Oregon requires that the patient submit 
a signed and dated written request, with two witnesses as well as an oral 
request, that has been reiterated to the physician within fifteen days of the 
original request.141 Further, the physician must verify that the patient is 
making an informed decision, and if he or she feels that a patient’s judgment 
is impaired due to psychiatric or psychological order or depression, then the 
physician must refer the patient for counseling.142 Here, we have two 
analogous situations where terminally ill patients are making end-of-life 
 
 134. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (2019). 
  135. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (2019). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Furrow, supra note 108, at 1450. 
 139. Medically assisted death is “medical care designed to help a patient die how and when the 
patient wants to die.” Id. at 1425. 
 140. Id. at 1450. 
 141. Id. at 1453. 
 142. Id. at 1452. 
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decisions that will, or likely will, result in death. As such, the set of laws 
governing rational decision making in each circumstance should be equally 
robust. 
Patients who are facing end-of-life medical decisions are subject to 
external pressure, whether it is familial, financial, or other.143 As such, other 
laws besides the federal Right to Try Act regulating terminally ill patients 
making end-of-life decisions require some form of heightened informed 
consent to ensure that the patient is making a rational decision; under EA, 
for example, the FDA requires IRB approval of informed consent.144 As 
another example, the California Act informed consent requirement includes 
language tailored to ensure that a patient understands he or she is facing 
death.145 Finally, the extensive protective requirements in the Oregon Act 
were put in place as mechanisms to protect vulnerable patients against ill-
advised rejection of life-sustaining treatment.146 Moreover, courts have also 
emphasized that where an experiment is risky and of uncertain benefit to the 
patient, the adequacy of the patient’s informed consent should be closely 
scrutinized.147 
Going against this trend, the federal Right to Try Act removes those 
important heightened protections for patients by bypassing FDA 
requirements and IRB approval.148 In conjunction with absolving drug 
companies and physicians of liability, this leaves already vulnerable patients 
extremely unprotected, which is unacceptable. However, if the federal Right 
to Try Act adopts California’s and Oregon’s heightened informed consent 
requirements, this may compensate for its limited liability feature. Such an 
amendment would keep limited liability intact, which would appease drug 
companies and physicians, and still allow a proactive protection of quality 
care and patient autonomy. 
 
B. CONCERNS REGARDING EXPLOITATION OF TERMINALLY ILL 
PATIENTS 
Since its enactment, there has been widespread fear that the federal 
Right to Try Act will bring about ethical consequences with drug companies 
and sponsors commoditizing desperation, finding ways to profiteer from the 
 
 143. Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1393, 1435 (1999). 
 144. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4) (2009). 
 145. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (2019). 
 146. Meisel, supra note 138, at 1434. 
 147.  Jennifer Piel, Informed Consent in Right-To-Try Cases, 44 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 290 (2016). 
 148. Id. 
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new avenue of putting non-FDA approved drugs on the market.149 Critics 
claim that the federal Right to Try Act will legitimize what is known as the 
“Burzynski practice model,”150 a business model whereby the highly 
controversial Doctor Stanislaw Burzynski (“Burzynski”) provided treatment 
to cancer patients as an alternative to chemotherapy for the price of $20,000 
to start, and $7,500 per month to continue.151 In the late 1990s, Burzynski 
was prosecuted for violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, and he 
was ordered to administer his drugs exclusively through FDA clinical 
trials.152 Since then, Burzynski has still been able to treat his patients through 
Phase II clinical trials, but virtually none of his treatments pass on to Phase 
III.153 After decades of implementing treatments that have not yet proven 
effective, Burzynski has gained a bad reputation for profiting by taking 
advantage of his sick and vulnerable patients.154 According to the U.S. 
National Institute of Health, Burzynski started over sixty medical studies 
over the years, but has only completed one, with the status of “unknown” or 
“withdrawn” for virtually all of his remaining studies.155 Now that the federal 
Right to Try Act allows investigational drug treatment without the 
requirement that patients be enrolled in Phase II clinical trials at all, there is 
concern that it will be even easier for Burzynski to continue and other 
companies to follow his business model.156 
New companies are already appearing, ready to do business under the 
federal Right to Try Act, such as Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics Inc. 
(“Brainstorm”).157 Brainstorm is a small biotechnology company that plans 
on offering investigational cell therapy treatment to patients with Lou 
Gehrig’s disease, which its CEO estimates will cost patients over 
$300,000.158 Additionally, Brainstorm has plans to offer an investigational 
treatment called NurOwn to help patients who have amyotrophic lateral 
 
 149. Max Nisen, ‘Right-to-Try’ Drug Law Offers No Miracle Cure, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-24/right-to-try-drug-law-risks-exploiting-despera 
te-patients. 
 150. David Gorski, Right-to-Try is Now Law. Let Patients Beware!, SCIENCE BASED MED. (June 4, 
2018), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/right-to-try-is-now-law-let-patients-beware/. 
 151.  Cancer Doctor Under Fire for Providing False Hope to Patients, FOX NEWS, (Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://www.foxnews.com/health/cancer-doctor-under-fire-for-providing-false-hope-to-patients. 
 152. Gorski, supra note 145. 
 153. Id. 
 154. FOX NEWS, supra note 146. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Gorski, supra note 145. 
 157. Michelle Cortez, The ‘Right to Try’ Could Cost Dying Patients a Fortune, BLOOMBERG (June 
20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/the-price-to-try-a-drug-could-be-300-
000-for-dying-patients. 
 158. Id. 
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sclerosis, or ALS, for an estimated $375,000.159 As insurers typically do not 
offer coverage for unproven treatment methods, terminally ill patients will 
be adding serious financial risk to their grave medical conditions.160 
 
1. Protecting Patients versus Scientific Innovation 
 
The U.S. health care industry has long been subject to health care price 
gouging161 and profiteering. Total U.S. health care spending reached $3.3 
trillion in 2016, which was 17.9% of the GDP.162 Among the eleven 
developed nations, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, the U.S. spends the most money on health care and is ranked 
as the worst performing.163 In 2014, these nations spent 9%, 10%, 11.1%, 
11%, 10.9%, 9.4%, 9.3%, 11.2%, 11.4%, 9.9%, and 16.6% of their GDP on 
health care, respectively.164 As the money is apparently not going toward 
quality health care, it is worth pointing out that the U.S. health care industry’s 
total annual profit in 2009 was $200 billion, with a median annual 
compensation of more than $12.4 million for CEO’s at big health care 
companies, surpassing finance CEO’s by two-thirds.165 For-profit and non-
profit health insurance companies, hospital operators, laboratory testing 
companies, and health care real estate investment trusts, are all among the 
parties that stand to profit from the industry, but “Big Pharma” is “the 800-
pound gorilla in the room,” with more than $300 billion in annual revenue.166 
Since 1980, the pharmaceutical industry’s share of the GDP has more than 
tripled.167 
Despite this critique, the industry’s innovations have undeniably 
increased life expectancy and quality for countless lives.168 Since 2000, the 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) defines ‘gouging’ as “the unlawful or unfair raising of 
prices.”  
 162. Micah Hartman et al., National Health Care Spending in 2016: Spending and Enrollment 
Growth Slow After Initial Coverage Expansions, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.health 
affairs.org/doi/abs/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1299. 
 163. Ryan Bort, How Bad is U.S. Health Care? Among High Income Nations, It’s the Worst, Study 
Says, NEWSWEEK (July 14, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/united-states-health-care-rated-worst-
637114. 
 158. Eric C. Schneider et al., Mirror, Mirror 2017: International Comparison Reflects Flaws and 
Opportunities for Better U.S. Health Care, THE COMMON WEALTH FUND (July, 2017), https://interacti 
ves.commonwealthfund.org/2017/july/mirror-mirror/. 
 165. Matt Kapp, The Sick Business of Health-Care Profiteering, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 24, 2009), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2009/09/health-care200909. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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top pharmaceutical Research and Development (“R&D”) spenders, 
including Roche, Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, Pfizer, Merck, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, AstraZeneca, Sanofi, Eli Lilly, and GlaxoSmithKline,169 have 
increased their R&D spending annually by a growth rate of 1.76%.170 R&D 
spending is what yields success in scientific innovation.171 For example, in 
2004, Janssen, a Johnson & Johnson company, made a breakthrough 
discovery of a new anti-tuberculosis treatment, which received FDA 
Accelerated Approval in 2012 and was proven to be highly effective in 
curing tuberculosis.172 Novartis also pushed through big medical 
breakthrough in 2017, when it received FDA approval for a CAR-T cell 
therapy called Kymriah, used to treat cancer in children.173 Such medical 
breakthroughs are critical in the advancement of society and are made 
possible because drug companies have the profits to spend on R&D.174 
The controversy surrounding pharmaceutical price regulation is 
generations old. Drug companies have made a profound impact on millions 
of lives, fighting illnesses that account for a substantial portion of the 
nation’s health problems, such as arthritis, asthma, Alzheimer’s disease, 
heart disease, Crohn’s disease, cancer, multiple sclerosis, Lou Gehrig’s 
disease, and AIDS.175 Unfortunately, as medicine advances, the price tag on 
pharmaceuticals increase at an alarming rate, as well, sometimes to the point 
of price gouging.176 In the past, this has led to government regulation of 
pharmaceuticals, such as the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which 
created abbreviated regulatory pathways for generic versions of chemical 
drugs to reach the market.177 Today, the government is attempting to regulate 
generic versions of biologics in a similar way.178 Other attempts to regulate 
 
 169. John Carroll, The 15 Top R&D Spenders in the Global Biopharma Business: 2016, ENDPOINTS 
NEWS (July 13, 2016), https://endpts.com/top-pharma-biotech-research-development-budgets/. 
 170. Frank David, Pharma’s Not So Stingy With R&D After All, FORBES (May 14, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/frankdavid/2017/05/14/pharma-rd-2005-2015/#3894622931c1. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Hallie Levine, The Quest to End Tuberculosis: 13 Memorable Moments in Innovation, 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.jnj.com/innovation/key-moments-tuberculosis-
treatment-history. 
 173. Novartis Receives First Ever FDA Approval for a CAR-T Cell Therapy, Kymriah(TM) 
(CTL019), for Children and Young Adults with B-cell ALL That is Refractory or Has Relapsed at Least 
Twice, NOVARTIS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/novartis-receives-
first-ever-fda-approval-car-t-cell-therapy-kymriahtm-ctl019-children-and-young-adults-b-cell-all-refra 
ctory-or-has-relapsed-least-twice. 
 174. David, supra note 164. 
 175. Brian R. Bouggy, Follow-On Biologics Legislation: Striking A Balance Between Innovation 
and Affordability, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 367, 368 (2010). 
 176. Id. at 369. 
 177. Id. at 374. 
 178. Id. at 347. 
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the pharmaceutical industry include price control and price transparency.179 
These regulatory efforts open the debate of whether competition is harmful 
or helpful in the long run and if price regulation is necessary.180 Opponents 
of regulation argue that studies show that price control is harmful to long-
term research and development because it reduces research investment, 
which stifles the discovery of promising therapies, leading to a shortage of 
life-enhancing and life-saving treatments.181 They argue instead that 
competition is the best way to lower prices while maintaining incentives for 
innovation, and that price transparency laws may be able to assist.182 The 
federal Right to Try Act pathway to experimental drugs creates an analogous 
dilemma between providing affordable life-saving treatment and allowing 
the pharmaceutical industry to act freely and stimulate competition. 
 
2. Solution: Anti-Price Gouging and FDA Inclusion Will Provide Middle 
Ground 
 
Drug companies are for-profit corporations that need incentives in order 
to produce products; it is unrealistic to expect them not to charge patients for 
investigational drugs.183 One proposed solution is to amend the federal Right 
to Try Act to include an anti-price gouging section. In 2017, Maryland 
passed HB 631, “[a]n Act concerning Public Health- Essential Off-Patent or 
Generic Drugs-Price Gouging-Prohibition” (“Maryland Act”), a state price 
gouging law enacted to prevent the sharp increase in price of generic drugs 
and safeguard Maryland residents’ access to prescription drugs.184 The 
Maryland Act defined “price gouging” as “an unconscionable increase in the 
price of a prescription drug.”185 The Maryland Act further defined 
“unconscionable increase” as one that is “excessive and not justified by the 
cost of producing the drug or the cost of appropriate expansion of access to 
the drug to promote public health” and “results in consumers having no 
meaningful choice about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price” 
due to the consumer’s conditions.186 Unfortunately, one year later, the United 
 
 179. Matthew Glans, Research & Commentary: Drug Price Controls and Price Transparency, THE 
HEARTLAND INST. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.heartland.org/publications-resources/publications 
/research--commentary-drug-price-controls-and-price-transparency?source=policybot. 
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 183. See Cortez, supra note 152. 
 184.  Ian Duncan, Maryland Law Against Price-Gouging by Drug Companies is Unconstitutional, 
Appeals Court Rules, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan 
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States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the law 
unconstitutionally violated the Dormant Commerce Clause as a direct state-
imposed limitation on interstate commerce.187 However, a price-gouging 
amendment to the federal Right to Try Act would not run into the same 
Dormant Commerce Clause issues because the federal government holds a 
constitutional right to regulate interstate commerce, and should therefore be 
constitutional.188 
Although pharmaceutical anti-price-gouging laws that prohibit 
unconscionable price increases do protect consumers in disaster markets, 
price-gouging regulations in general raise potentially serious long-term 
economic effects.189 Opponents claim that artificially low prices from anti-
price-gouging laws quickly create shortages and end up creating higher 
transactional costs for buyers.”190 Also, sellers may face a higher cost of 
operation for a lower or similarly priced good, which may cause the seller to 
stop selling.191 However, as legitimate as these concerns are, the market for 
experimental drugs is distinguished from the typical disaster market in which 
general price gouging occurs, in that the gouging is due to having an 
untreatable terminal illness rather than sharing in a state of disaster such as 
a hurricane.192 Also, the expensive price of experimental drugs is not per se 
due to a high consumer demand, but rather due to drug companies financial 
interests in covering costs and profiting.193 Therefore, the long-term 
economic concerns that critics raise over general price-gouging laws may 
not apply in the context of the federal Right to Try Act. 
Another proposed solution is to re-incorporate FDA oversight over the 
price setting of experimental drugs. The FDA already monitors charging for 
investigational drugs under EA.194 If a sponsor is providing a patient with a 
drug under EA, it must obtain FDA authorization to charge for that drug.195 
The FDA will authorize charging if the sponsor submits documentation that 
shows calculations reviewed and approved by an independent certified 
public accountant that comply with the recoverable costs.196 The recoverable 
 
 187. Id. at 693. 
 188. See id. at 666. 
 189. Duncan, supra note 179; Emily Bae, Are Anti-Price Gouging Legislations Effective Against 
Sellers During Disasters?, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 79, 80–83 (2009). 
 190. Bae, supra note 184, at 82. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id.; Cortez, supra note 152. 
 194. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2009). 
 195. Id. A sponsor “means a person who takes responsibility for and initiates a clinical investigation. 
The sponsor may be an individual or pharmaceutical company, governmental agency, academic 
institution, private organization, or other organization.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b). 
 196. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2009). 
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costs may only include the direct costs of manufacturing and making the 
investigational drug available, such as the cost of “raw materials, labor, and 
nonreusable supplies and equipment used to manufacture the quantity of 
drug needed for which charging is authorized.”197 Incorporating FDA 
oversight into the charging of experimental drugs under the federal Right to 
Try Act might defeat the purpose behind the Act of eliminating the FDA’s 
role in giving patients access to experimental drugs.198 However, requiring 
the federal Right to Try Act to limit charges on direct costs, as the FDA 
already requires under EA, is the middle ground that protects patients from 
being financially exploited by drug companies and also ensures that drug 





In conclusion, the federal Right to Try Act as currently enacted is 
imbalanced to favor drug companies because it raises issues of quality, 
individual autonomy, and financial exploitation of vulnerable patients. The 
issues of quality and individual autonomy must be addressed by amending 
the Act to include robust informed consent requirements as seen in 
California’s version of the Right to Try Act and in Oregon’s similar Death 
with Dignity Act. Such amendments would protect terminally ill patients in 
the same way that the federal Right to Try Act currently protects drug 
companies and physicians from liability for experimental treatment. As for 
the financial exploitation issues, adding amendments to the federal Right to 
Try Act that incorporates anti-price-gouging law or incorporates FDA 
oversight of charging for only direct costs of investigational drugs should 
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